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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of Certificate Transparency
(CT) over time and explore the implications of exposing certificate
DNS names from the perspective of security and privacy. We find
that certificates in CT logs have seen exponential growth. Website
support for CT has also constantly increased, with now 33% of
established connections supporting CT. With the increasing deploy-
ment of CT, there are also concerns of information leakage due to
all certificates being visible in CT logs. To understand this threat,
we introduce a CT honeypot and show that data from CT logs is
being used to identify targets for scanning campaigns only minutes
after certificate issuance. We present and evaluate a methodology
to learn and validate new subdomains from the vast number of
domains extracted from CT logged certificates.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Certificate Transparency (CT) logs provide an append-only public
ledger of TLS certificates in order to make the TLS ecosystem au-
ditable. In April 2018, CT was made mandatory in Chrome for all
newly issued certificates, for the first time offering a full view of the
TLS ecosystem. This full view has pros and cons. It may increase
security as owners of domain names can now verify certificates
that have been issued globally for their names and thus are able to
notice incorrectly issued certificates. On the negative side, CT ex-
poses domain names in a way that eases identification of previously
unknown domains and services.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
IMC ’18, October 31-November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5619-0/18/10. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278562
In this paper, we contribute to a better understanding of CT
rollout and related security and privacy implications:
CA andCT Log Evolution (§ 2):Using data of all CT log servers
deployed, we investigate the evolution of CT logs over time and the
dependency of Certificate Authorities (CAs) on CT log operators.
Server CT Deployment (§ 3): Using passive and active mea-
surements, we quantify the evolution of CT adoption among server
operators and show positive effects.
DNS Information Leakage (§ 4):We investigate the mass leak-
age of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs), and use subdomain
data to construct and query new FQDNs.
Detecting Phishing Domains (§ 5):We show that CT logs can
be used to detect and study phishing domains.
CT Honeypot (§ 6):We introduce a CT honeypot to show that
third parties monitor CT logs to initiate likely malicious scans.
We aim to fully support reproducible research [37] and publish data
and code under https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1452291
2 TIMELINE OF CT LOG EVOLUTION
CT aims to make CA-issued certificates transparent by publishing
them to CT logs, ideally operated by independent parties. This
allows to catch and attribute mis-issuances sooner. Logs are append-
only and use Merkle Hash Trees, which allows to detect tampering
with a log’s history. For every logged certificate, the log creates a
Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT), which serves as an inclusion
promise and which can be verified using the log’s public key. SCTs
can be sent inside a TLS extension, as part of a stapled Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) response, or embedded in the
certificate. To embed a SCT in a certificate, a CA must submit a
so-called precertificate to a CT log. The log returns an SCT, which
the CA can then embed in the final certificate.
From its beginnings as an RFC proposed by Google, Certificate
Transparency has seen a strong interest on the side of Web in-
frastructure providers. However, at the release time of the initial
experimental RFC 6962 [22] only few certificates showed up in CT
logs—mainly Google and Go Daddy certificates were logged to
Google repositories. Relevant counter-incentives against publish-
ing in these logs exist, mainly related to privacy, business protection,
and security, as we will detail in Sections 4 and 6.
To enforce deployment, Google, in its unique position of con-
trolling a large portion of the browser market, evolved Chrome
CT policy over time, from EV-indicator-only to all certificate types
requiring diversely operated log entries [5]. Towards a universal
requirement, an initial announcement [38] was made in October
2016, that as of October 2017, Google Chrome would only mark
new certificates trusted if they complied with Chrome’s Certificate
Transparency policy. Still, use by CAs remained relatively weak
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(a) Cumulative growth of logged precertificates
by Certification Authority (CA).
(b) Relative update rate per CA and day. Let’s
Encrypt dominates after starting to log.
(c) Distribution of precertificate logging by CAs over
different CT logs for April 2018.
Figure 1: Cumulative logged precertificate growth per CA, relative log rates of CAs, and distribution of logging by CA and Log.
as can be seen from Figure 1a, in which we display the cumula-
tive growth of precertificates in all trusted CT logs over time. All
data was harvested directly from the publicly available logs. Precer-
tificates, which are untrusted issuance promises, can, unlike final
certificates, only be published by Certificate Authorities themselves.
In a second attempt in April 2017, and in alignment with fixes to
the initial RFC 6962, Google pushed for April 18, 2018 as the new
date of strict CT policy enforcement by Chrome [29, 39].Widely per-
ceived, this deadline was taken seriously and deployment activities
started. The top five issuing CAs (subsuming various Issuer-CNs),
which accounted for 99% of the certificates in April, 2018, increased
certificate publishing exponentially with pronounced final jumps
starting in March, 2018 (Fig. 1a). It is interesting to follow the differ-
ent time spans chosen by the CAs as visualized in Figure 1b. Over
a long period, DigiCert dominated activities, followed by more ir-
regular additions by Comodo, GlobalSign, and StartCom. In March
2018, Let’s Encrypt started logging precertificates with an update
rate above 2M certificates per day into few logs.
The graphs in Figure 1 show how Let’s Encrypt and few other
CAs dominate; the publishing behavior of a handful of CAs shapes
the CT infrastructure by (un)balancing the utilization of logs. Figure
1c displays the cross-publishing relation between CAs and logs in
a heatmap that is very sparsely populated. Zooming in on Let’s
Encrypt (left-most column) shows a worrying trend: besides Google
logs, the Nimbus log is carrying the main load. This has recently
even led to performance issues at Nimbus, resulting in a disquali-
fication discussion [24]. The five big CAs publish only to a small
selection of CT logs, making the ecosystem vulnerable to issues at
those logs. We argue that CAs should distribute their logging load
more evenly among logs and log operators.
3 SERVER DEPLOYMENT OF CT
This section examines actual CT server deployment in the Internet.
3.1 Datasets
We use two datasets. To measure the actual use of CT in the Inter-
net, we passively monitor the Internet uplink of the University of
California at Berkeley (UCB) for approximately a year. We only ex-
amine outgoing connections to prevent bias from the internal server
population. We use the Bro Network Security Monitor [31]. In prior
work [1], we extended Bro to support analysis and validation of
Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs), i.e., promises from logs that
a certificate has been included. We extract these promises using all
supported ways of transmission. For our analysis we examine traffic
from 2017-04-26 to 2018-05-23. During this time we saw 26.5G TLS
connections (25.6G on port 443). As our prior work [1] has shown
TLS observations to yield similar results in the US, Germany, and
Australia, we do not expect any geographic bias in this analysis.
To examine deployment on the Internet we perform an ac-
tive Internet-wide scan of HTTPS and examine the certificates
on servers. We create traffic traces and run these through Bro,
resulting in the same processing pipeline for active and passive
measurements. Our active scan, similar to [1, 14, 35, 36], builds on
a large (≈423M) list of DNS domain names, which we resolve for
A and AAAA records, conduct zmap scans on port tcp/443, and
subsequently scan using a custom-built TLS scanner. We conduct
weekly scans, and used a scan from May 18, 2018.
Ethical Considerations. For active scans, we minimize interfer-
ence by following best scanning practices, such as those outlined
in [11], by maintaining a blacklist and using dedicated servers with
informing rDNS names, websites, and abuse contacts. We assess
whether data collection can harm individuals or reveal private in-
formation as proposed by [10, 30]. Our passive data collection was
cleared by UCB. Note that the data collection specifically excludes
or anonymizes sensitive information, such as client IP addresses.
Additionally, passively collected data never leaves institute systems.
For more information about collected data, see [1].
3.2 CT Adoption
We take a look at how Certificate Transparency is currently adopted.
We do this by examining TLS traffic at UCB and inspecting SCTs.
These contain the signature of a CT log that promises the inclu-
sion of a certificate. An SCT can be contained in a certificate, sent
separately in a TLS extension, or sent in a stapled OCSP reply.
In total over our measurement period, 8.6G (32.61%) of the ob-
served connections contained at least one SCT. 5.7G (21.40%) con-
tained at least one SCT in the certificate, 3G (11.21%) at least one
SCT in the TLS extension and 2M (>0.01%) contained at least one
SCT in a stapled OCSP response. Connections where an SCT was
seen via several transmission methods are relatively rare. 30.8K
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Figure 2: Percent daily connections containing an SCT (sctconns),
split by transmission mode of embedding (cert) or TLS extension
(tls). OCSP not included due to their rarity.
Table 1: Top 15 CT logs by number of observed connections
CT Log (Chrome inclusion date) Cert SCTs ↓ TLS SCTs
Google Pilot log (6/14) 5.11G (28.69%) 1.58G (26.03%)
Symantec log (9/15) 3.28G (18.40%) 2.44G (40.19%)
Google Rocketeer log (4/15) 3.09G (17.33%) 1.42G (23.30%)
DigiCert Log Server (1/15) 1.78G (10.01%) 9,533 (0.00%)
Google Skydiver log (11/16) 1.06G (5.97%) 54.25M (0.89%)
Google Aviator log (6/14) 1.05G (5.94%) 10,730 (0.00%)
Venafi log (10/15) 994.85M (5.58%) 148.91M (2.45%)
DigiCert Log Server 2 (6/17) 671.56M (3.77%) 12.98M (0.21%)
Symantec Vega log (2/16) 661.21M (3.71%) 1.33M (0.02%)
Comodo Mammoth CT log (7/17) 78.42M (0.44%) 225.10M (3.71%)
Cloudflare Nimbus2018 Log (3/18) 8.56M (0.05%) 104K (0.00%)
Google Icarus log (11/16) 7.30M (0.04%) 4,488 (0.00%)
Cloudflare Nimbus2020 Log (3/18) 4450213 (0.02%) 13,325 (0.00%)
Comodo Sabre CT log (7/17) 2.66M (0.01%) 120.42M (1.98%)
Certly.IO log (4/15) 1.53M (0.01%) 1 (0.00%)
connections contained an SCT in both the certificate and the TLS
extension; 29 in both the certificate and an stapled OCSP reply.
Connections that contain the SCT in both the OCSP reply and the
TLS extensions are more common: this happens in 1.5M connec-
tions. Figure 2 shows the percentage of connections that contain
an SCT, split by source. As we can see the number of connections
containing an SCT stays relatively constant, even after Chrome
enforcement started in April 2018. We assume that this picture
will change in the near future with gradual certificate replacement,
and given the extreme increase in logging as seen in Figure 1a.
We manually examined several of the peaks in Figure 2; they were
caused by large amounts of requests to graph.facebook.com. We are
unable to determine the root-cause for this abnormality with our
data. Table 1 shows the logs that we see used in traffic, split by
transmission type. As we can see a small number of logs dominate.
As for client support, in 17.7G (66.76%) of connections the client
signals its support for the SCT extensions.
3.3 Server Support
We investigate server-side deployment of CT with active scans.
29.5M (68.7%) of the 42.8M unique certificates that we encounter
in our scan have an embedded SCT. Furthermore, for 335.7K unique
certificates the server sends a SCT in the TLS extension; for 1,214
certificates in the stapled OCSP reply. In total, 3.7M IPs serve an
SCT for at least one of their hosted sites. With the use of TLS-SNI,
this ≈12-fold multiplexing of certificates per IP is expected.
Looking at the SCTs contained in certificates, the picture is very
different from our passive observation in Table 1: 74% of certificates
contain an SCT issued by the Cloudflare Nimbus2018 Log; 71% from
the Google Icarus log. The next most common log is the Google
Rocketeer log (19.04%) and the Comodo Sabre CT log (12.52%). SCTs
from other logs are contained in less than 10% of certificates.
This shows that characteristics of certificates generally encoun-
tered by users in the Internet vary strongly from those offered across
the Internet. We presume this is caused by the high popularity of
certain services.
3.4 Certificates with invalid embedded SCTs
Our previous work [1] revealed that SCTs are generally used cor-
rectly, except for few cases in which invalid SCTs are sent via TLS
extensions, and one case with an invalid embedded SCT.
Withmore CAs having started to embed SCTs in their certificates,
we re-evaluate this by examining our passive and active scan data.
We find 16 certificates from 4 CAs that have invalid SCTs embedded.
We inquired with the CAs to determine the reasons.
One certificate with an invalid embedded SCT was issued by
TeliaSonera [40]. Inquiring with TeliaSonera revealed that this cer-
tificate was one of the first certificates they used to test CT. The
certificate was a re-issuance of an earlier certificate, of which the
SCT was included in the newer certificate. We also encounter 12
certificates issued by GlobalSign with invalid SCTs [15]. Our analy-
sis revealed that all these certificates had Subject Alternative Names
(SANs) with both DNS names and IP addresses, and that the order
of entries had changed in the final certificate. We reported this to
GlobalSign, who confirmed the issue and deployed a patch. Our
data also contains 2 certificates with invalid SCTs issued by D-
Trust [8], a German CA, who acknowledged the issue. The reason
was an error in their issuance process—in some cases, the order-
ing of X.509 extensions differed between precertificate and final
certificate, invalidating the SCT. We found one certificate issued
by NetLock, a Hungarian CA, with an invalid embedded SCT [27].
Here, precertificate and final certificate contained entirely different
SAN names and even issuer names. We contacted NetLock, who
acknowledged the issue, re-issued the certificate, and revoked the
original, but did not share a root cause.
Looking back at these issues we think that all of them can be
considered birth pangs in specific and rare corner cases—CAs are
still adapting to the requirements of having to embed SCTs into their
certificates. When generating precertificates and final certificates,
even fields without an inherent order need to be kept consistent, a
requirement that CA software did not have to fulfill before.
Our disclosure of invalid SCTs to the community also fueled
a discussion on whether or not CAs should log final certificates
besides their precertificates. As we could provably identify issues by
comparing final and precertificates, Let’s Encrypt began a journey
to log all final certificates [18], and the broader community also
identified this as desirable [9, 19]. When Let’s Encrypt initially
started to log final certificates, they quickly induced performance
problems in some logs [19]. This also highlights a risk of unlogged
IMC ’18, October 31-November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA Scheitle et al.
final certificates: As CT logs accept all valid certificates, a mass
submission of valid unlogged final certificates could be used to
overwhelm logs, which could lead to log disqualification [24].
4 LEAKAGE OF DNS INFORMATION
The Common Name (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
fields in certificates contain fully qualified domain names (FQDNs),
often including subdomains. This makes CT a useful data source to
learn about the existence of subdomains, which in turn may reveal
information about the service and software for which the subdo-
main is used. Examples are subdomain labels such as autodiscover
(MS Exchange); webmail or smtp for email; api for API access; dev
and staging for development operations; owncloud and citrix for
the respective products; or simply m for sites’ mobile versions.
The leaking of DNS information was a concern about CT from
the beginning: Symantec even used to operate a special log (called
Deneb) whose explicit goal was to hide subdomains [1]. There are
also efforts to standardize label redaction [17]. Subdomain enumer-
ation is often used in the preparation of an attack and a common
methodology in penetration testing. Sources like [2] even propose
to query online databases such as censys.io or crt.sh when targeting
particular, single domains. The bulk use of CT data has, to the best
of our knowledge, not been tried yet.
The key questions we investigate are hence: how much poten-
tially sensitive information is given away in CT, and can it be used
for subdomain enumeration?
4.1 Data sources and processing
We describe our data sources and how we processed our data.
Parsing DNS names. To extract subdomains, we extract all labels
under a base domain, which we define as the domain under a public
suffix per Public Suffix List (PSL) [13].
CT Data. We extract all DNS names from CN and SAN fields of
all certificates in CT logs as of 2018-04-26. Some DNS names in
these fields are not valid FQDNs as defined by RFC 1035 (and later
updates). We eliminate these using the Python validators library.
Every FQDN is counted only once.
Domain Lists. For our enumeration attempts, we use the same
list of registrable domain as [1]. The list includes 206M FQDNs
underneath public suffixes and is mainly constructed from various
large zone files, e.g., .com, .net, and .org.
Sonar Forward DNS. For validation, we use the Sonar database
[33] as of 2018-04-27 and parse it using the PSL. The database
contains FQDNs and the result of A record DNS lookups. There are
1.3G FQDNs, of which only 1.1G have subdomains. The total count
of distinct subdomain labels is 962M.
Our list and the Sonar list are relatively disjunct: 82% (37.7M) of
our registrable domains (in a given public suffix) occur on the Sonar
list as well (in the same public suffix). However, of the subdomain
labels from our list, only 21% appear also as subdomain labels on
the Sonar list (irrespective of the suffix).
4.2 Analysis of Subdomains
We parse the FQDNs obtained from CT as described above and
count how often each subdomain label occurs across all suffixes.
Table 2: Top 20 subdomain labels (SDL) in CT-logged certificates.
SDL Count SDL Count SDL Count
1 www 61.1M 8 shop 303k 15 secure 176k
2 mail 14.4M 9 whm 280k 16 admin 158k
3 webdisk 8.7M 10 dev 256k 17 mobile 156k
4 webmail 8.6M 11 remote 253k 18 server 146k
5 cpanel 8.2M 12 test 249k 19 cloud 141k
6 autodiscover 3.6M 13 api 239k 20 smtp 140k
7 m 310k 14 blog 235k
Not unexpectedly, this is an extreme distribution: very few sub-
domain labels account for by far the most occurrences. The top
subdomain label, www accounts for 95% of subdomains, and the
top 10 subdomain labels for 99% of all occurrences. The top 20
subdomain labels are shown in Table 2.
Possibly of note are webdisk, cpanel and whm, which all point at
the existence of management interfaces, and could be interesting
targets for password attacks.
We also determine the most common subdomain label for each
public suffix, and find that, for example, git is the most common sub-
domain label for the suffix tech; autoconfig for email; api for cloud;
ftp for design; sip for gov; and dialin for gov.uk—possibly reflecting
the services most commonly deployed under those suffixes.
4.3 Subdomain Enumeration
Commonly, subdomain enumeration uses word lists to prepend
words as subdomain labels to known registrable domains. Two
popular hacking tools, subbrute [34] and dnsrecon [32], ship such
wordlists. We test whether they would find the FQDNs that are
logged in CT. subbrute comes with a list of 101k subdomain labels.
Interestingly, just 16 of these occur as subdomain labels in logged
certificates. Visual inspection of the list confirms our impression
that most entries are unlikely to be common choices for subdomains.
dnsrecon ships 1.9k names; just 12 appear as subdomain labels in
CT. Since these tools would not have found real, existing FQDNs,
we did not use them for further comparisons.
Constructing FQDNs from CT data. We construct FQDNs from
subdomain labels in CT strategically and verify their existence
next. We first determine which subdomain labels occur frequently
in a public suffix, and prepend only these labels to the registrable
domains in that suffix.We filter out any subdomain label that occurs
less than 100k times in the entire data set. Both steps limit the total
number of FQDNs we have to verify using DNS. We disregard the
zones .com, .net, and .org: they are too generic for our purpose. For
every subdomain label, we filter for the top 10 most common public
suffixes in which it occurs. We finally prepend the subdomain label
to those domains from our domain list [1] that fall into the 10
suffixes. This method leaves us with 210.7M new FQDNs to test.
Verifying the Existence of FQDNs. We usemassdns to determine
whether our new FQDNs have an A record. We need to rule out
zones where queries for non-existing subdomains would return a
default A record. To this end, we create a second list of FQDNs,
where we replace the subdomain label with a 16-character pseudo-
random string.
We then scan for both the pseudorandom FQDN as well as the
constructed one, following CNAME indirection up to 10 times. We
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Table 3: Potential phishing domains identified in CT.
Service Count Example
Apple 63k appleid.apple.com-7etr6eti.gq
PayPal 58k paypal.com-account-security.money
Microsoft 4k www-hotmail-login.live
Google 1k accounts.google.co.am
eBay <1k www.ebay.co.uk.dll7.bid
disregard IP addresses not part of our border router’s routing table
as invalid. This rules out misconfigured DNS servers. It also makes
our numbers lower bounds.
We obtain 80.3M replies to our test DNS names, and 61.5M replies
to our pseudo-random controls. This yields 18.8M cases of new
FQDNs with previously unknown subdomains.
Comparison to Sonar. Of our 18.8M newly found FQDNs, only
1.1M were known via the Sonar list. This results in 17.7M newly
constructed and discovered subdomains from CT, making it an
additional source to infer new FQDNs and subdomains that do not
yet occur in public lists.
5 DETECTING PHISHING DOMAINS
With the general move towards HTTPS on all sites, phishing sites
need certificates as well. Hence, CT data should be useful to detect
phishing domains. Facebook and CertSpotter even offer notification
services for operators [12, 23] to receive advisories about potential
phishing attempts against their users. However, their methods are
not disclosed, and an independent analysis of efficacy is not avail-
able. We hence decided to explore the viability of using CT data to
find phishing domains with a pilot experiment.
After removing legitimate domains, e.g., subdomains of apple.com
are considered legitimate Apple domains, we observe 63k domains
including the string appleid, of which 42k have com, ga, info, tk, and
ml public suffixes. The vast majority of these appear to mimic Apple
ID log-in URLs, probably for phishing credentials. Using simple
regular expression matching techniques and visual inspection, we
further identify over 126k unique potential phishing domains across
the five common services shown in Table 3. Our regular expressions
match domains which include the name of the service or a subset of
labels of its FQDN (e.g. login.live for Microsoft), and we exclude the
service’s legitimate domains. Of the eBay phishing domains, 28%
use the bid and review public suffixes; similarly, 4% of Microsoft
Live phishing domains use the live suffix, suggesting a link between
phishing target and public suffix choice.
Additionally, we identify several subdomains imitating gov-
ernment taxation offices such as the Australian Taxation Office
(e.g., ato.gov.au.eng-atorefund.com), U.K. HM Revenue and Customs
(e.g., hmrc.gov.uk-refund.cf ), and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(e.g., refund.irs.gov.my-irs.com).
Based on our initial findings, and the observation that many
phishing domains include a variation of the target’s FQDN, we
believe CT data to be a very promising way to defend against phish-
ing attacks, opening a new research direction. We have reported
phishing domains to CERTs and affected companies.
6 CT HONEYPOT
In this section, we introduce CT Honeypot. Its purpose beyond
a regular honeypot [26] is twofold: First, a better understanding
whether data within CT logs is monitored by third parties to gather
knowledge about potential new service endpoints. Second, a better
understanding of activities when this knowledge is available. We
assume the following attacker model: A malicious user observes
CT logs to identify new DNS names. Based on this data, the at-
tacker precisely targets victims, instead of performing uninformed
scanning of the IP address space to find vulnerable services.
A CT honeypot consists of the following four building blocks: (i)
unique random (sub-)domains that are hard to guess, (ii) leaking the
existence of subdomains exclusively via Certificate Transparency
logs (i.e., creating CT-logged certificates), (iii) monitoring requests
to the authoritative DNS server, and (iv) monitoring of communi-
cation to A/AAAA records of the subdomains.
6.1 Implementation and Setup
We create random 12-character subdomains, which we leak to CT
by obtaining certificates. To prevent leakage by third parties and
to closely monitor lookup activities, we control the authoritative
name server for these DNS domain names.
To discern informed from arbitrary scanning, we deploy two
methods: (i) For each subdomain, we create an AAAA record with
a unique IPv6 address. We do not enter these IPv6 addresses into
the rDNS tree to avoid discovery through rDNS walking, and do
not use them in any other way. We also create A records for the
subdomains, but due to the small address space, IPv4 addresses are
not suited to discern informed scanning. (ii) We monitor whether
scanners use the subdomains in subsequent connections, e.g., as a
TLS-SNI or in HTTP GET requests.
In 3 batches, we create 11 honeypot subdomains over 18 days.
We store full packet captures from our monitors from 2018-04-12
14:00 UTC until 2018-05-15 14:00 UTC. We filter out DNS queries
from the issuing CA’s validation infrastructure, identified by DNS
queries before CT logging and validated by our prior work [35].
6.2 Results
DNS Queries. After publication of precertificates for our subdo-
mains in CT logs, we see the first DNS queries for corresponding
domain names after 73 seconds to ≈3 minutes (see Table 4). This
clearly highlights that CT logs are monitored. We can distinguish
between two types of queries: Queries that occur among almost all
domain names and queries that occur occasionally. We now analyze
the DNS resolvers and their queries in more detail. It is important
to note that after the first DNS lookup, a domain name may also be
learned from sources other than CT, such as DNS threat intelligence
networks like FarSight’s DNSDB. However, the initial leakage still
comes from CT logs.
We receive DNS queries from Google (AS 15169), 1&1 (AS 8560),
Amazon (AS 16509), and DigitalOcean (AS 14061) for all 11 domains.
From Deteque (AS 54054) we see requests for 9 domains and from
OpenDNS (AS 36692) for 7 domains. Servers from those networks
start querying at least one domain name in less than 12 minutes,
except DigitalOcean that sends the first query after ≈2 hours. Devi-
ations in times are not surprising even in automated settings: First,
IMC ’18, October 31-November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA Scheitle et al.
Table 4: Per subdomain (A-K), we list its first CT log entry (all times UTC and 2018), the first DNS query, the time between CT log entry and
DNS query, the total count of DNS queries (Q), the count of DNS querying ASes (AS), the count of unique EDNS client subnets (CS), the first
3 connecting ASes, the first HTTP(S) connection, and the HTTP(S) ASNs.
CT log entry DNS ∆t Q AS CS First 3 ASes HTTP(S) ∆t HTTP ASNs
A 04-12 14:16:59 14:20:16 197s 55 14 4 ★15169,▲8560, ■54054 04-12 15:33:49 73m ◗14061,✤16509
B 04-12 14:18:31 14:19:44 73s 55 14 3 ★15169, ●44050,▲8560 04-12 15:38:27 79m ◗14061,✤14618
C 04-20 10:43:44 10:45:03 101s 81 14 3 ★15169, ■54054,▲8560 05-10 06:44:44 19d ◗14061,✤16509
D 04-30 13:00:28 13:02:08 96s 36 10 2 ★15169, ■54054,▲8560 04-30 14:53:46 111m ◗14061,✤16509
E 04-30 13:03:10 13:05:50 120s 30 12 3 ★15169,▲8560, ✤16509 04-30 14:50:39 85m ◗14061,✤16509
F 04-30 13:50:06 13:52:04 118s 36 13 3 ★15169,▲8560, ✤16509. 04-30 14:51:26 59m ◗14061,✤16509
G 04-30 14:00:07 14:02:05 118s 62 32 7 ★15169,▲8560, ●44050 05-10 06:26:51 5d ◗14061,✤16509
H 04-30 14:10:07 14:12:04 117s 32 11 3 ★15169,▲8560, ■54054 04-30 16:12:33 122m ◗14061,✤16509
I 04-30 14:20:07 14:22:04 117s 44 18 3 ★15169,▲8560, 24940 04-30 16:12:33 112m ◗14061,✤16509
J 04-30 14:30:07 14:32:07 120s 36 10 3 ★15169,▲8560, 12876 04-30 16:10:03 98m ◗14061,✤16509
K 04-30 14:40:07 14:42:11 124s 39 19 3 ★15169,▲8560, 19397 04-30 16:10:57 88m ◗14061,✤16509
★Google,▲1&1, ■Deteque, ●Petersburg Internet, ✤Amazon, 24940: Hetzner, 12876: Online, 19397: ACN, ◗Digital Ocean
time-triggered events may have a delay depending on probe load.
Second, setups may either be run in a streaming fashion, using e.g.,
CertStream [3], or in a batched fashion.
We also observe requests from 76 other ASes to one or two
domains, as well as requests for three and four domains from two
ASes each. In 99% of those cases, requests do not appear before one
hour, in 62% not before two hours. In contrast to the top servers
above, we argue that those requests are initiated from batch jobs as
opposed to near-real-time stream processing.
Now, looking at servers that poll data for more than 60% of
our domains, we note that Deteque is a division of Spamhaus and
offers DNS related threat intelligence. This business model indicates
intrinsic interest in recent DNS data. Furthermore, DNS requests
from Google’s public DNS resolver include the EDNS Client Subnet
field [7] in 169 cases. This DNS extension carries data about the
network that originated the DNS query. It helps us to reveal the
topological location of stub resolvers or clients which use Google’s
open recursive DNS resolver.We find 12 unique EDNS client subnets
at size /24. The top 3 are used 115, 25, and 10 times, while the
remaining 9 are only used 1-2 times.
Evaluating DNS lookups per included EDNS client subnet per-
mits us to identify a few interesting patterns: First, stub resolvers
in Hetzner (AS 29073) are using Google Public DNS service within
few minutes and scan A, AAAA, MX, NS, and SOA records. Second,
resolvers hosted in Quasi Networks (AS 29073) also very rapidly
query A and AAAA records via Google Public DNS.
Suspicious Connections. Out of 4 of the 12 EDNS client subnets,
1 machine each connects to our honeypot over IPv4. 3 out of these
4 machines only connect to TCP port 443 (HTTPS). One machine,
associated with a subnet recorded in 25 DNS queries, scanned 30
ports across our 2 machines, likely with malicious intent. This
heavily-scanning host is located in Quasi Network (AS 29073). This
Autonomous System has reincorporated in the Seychelles in 2015
and has since then been known to ignore all abuse messages [25].
We also note that across all inbound scans, no source IP address
followed scanning best practices such as informative rDNS names,
websites, or whois entries. This likely excludes benevolent scanners
from academia or industrial research as responsible entities.
To our unique IPv6 addresses, no inbound packets arrived except
those from the Let’s Encrypt validation server.
Conclusion. The variety of clients frequently querying our do-
mains within few minutes up to few hours indicates that several
entities implement backends to monitor CT logs and react quickly
to the appearance of new domain names. The correlation of DNS
clients and port scanners also indicates that CT logs are misused to
find potential targets for malicious connections. With the increase
of IPv6 deployment, which challenges scanning per se [20], we
expect more incidents in which CT logs are leveraged by attackers.
7 RELATEDWORK
Although standardization of CT began mid of 2012, it only recently
raised interest in the measurement community. Before CT was
mandatory in Chrome, focus was on active scans to quantify cover-
age of various certificate sources [41] and to describe basic proper-
ties of logs and certificates in the CT ecosystem [16]. Then, CT as
part of various HTTPS security extensions was analyzed [1]. Our
work confirms that corner-cases in CA software can cause invalid
CT certificates. Most recently, the performance impact of CT on
HTTPS [28] and the deployment of sub-par certificates sourced
from CT logs [14, 21] was measured. While the privacy implications
and traceability of TLS certificates has been studied before [4, 6, 42],
to the best of our knowledge, there is no detailed analysis on secu-
rity and privacy aspects due to the rise of CT.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that the deployment of Certificate Trans-
parency is progressing well but that this progress also introduces
new threats. First, the bulk of certificates is logged to very few logs,
creating a fragile ecosystem. Second, domain names of CT-logged
certificates reveal information that might be considered confiden-
tial or private. Third, leaked domain names are actively used in
Internet scanning, some of it likely malicious.
We agree that CT addresses a specific security vector, but, based
on our study, are also very concerned about new attack vectors
introduced by CT. We hope our results encourage work on coun-
termeasures to protect Internet infrastructure.
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